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Abstract:
Consider an exchange economy with asymmetric information. What is the set of
outcomes that are consistent with common knowledge of rationality and market clearing?
To address this question we de￿ne an epistemic model for the economy that provides
a complete description not only of the beliefs of each agent on the relationship between
states of nature and prices but also of the whole system of interactive beliefs. The main
result, theorem 1, provides a characterization of outcomes that are consistent with com-
mon knowledge of rationality and market clearing (henceforth, CKRMC outcomes) in
terms of a solution notion - Ex ￿ Post Rationalizability - that is de￿ned directly in
terms of the parameters that de￿ne the economy. We then apply theorem 1 to character-
ize the set of CKRMC outcomes in a general class of economies with two commodities.
CKRMC manifests several intuitive properties that stand in contrast to the full revela-
tion property of Rational Expectations Equilibrium: In particular, we obtain that for
a robust class of economies: (1) there is a continuum of prices that are consistent with
CKRMC in every state of nature, and hence these prices do not reveal the true state,
(2) the range of CKRMC outcomes is monotonically decreasing as agents become more
informed about the economic fundamentals, and (3) trade is consistent with common
knowledge of rationality and market clearing even when there is common knowledge that
there are no mutual gains from trade.
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We thank the Israel Science Foundation for grant NO 901/02 that supported this reseach. The work
on this paper was conducted while the ￿rst author was a member in the Institute of Avanced Study in
Princeton. The hospitality of the Institute is gratefully acknowledged. The ￿rst author also thanks the
support of the Shonbrunn chair in mathematical economics. We are grateful for comments of seminar
participants in the Institute for Advanced Study and the following universities, Cambridge, Columbia,
The Hebrew University, LSE, NYU, Penn, Princeton, Rutgers, Stanford, Yale, and Tel-Aviv. We are
especially grateful for the comments of the associate editor and two referees.
2The department of Economics and the center for rationality, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
e-mail: benporat@math.huji.ac.il
3The Economics and Management Department, The Open University of Israel, aviadh@openu.ac.il
11 Introduction
We study the implications of the assuming common knowledge of rationality and
market clearing in economies with asymmetric information.
The starting point is the concept of rational expectations equilibrium (REE). REE
extends the classical concept of a competitive equilibrium to economies with asymmetric
information (i.e., economies in which di⁄erent agents might have di⁄erent information).
When each agent has only partial information on the value of a commodity or an asset he
can deduce additional information from the prices because prices re￿ ect the information
that other agents have. REE is a solution concept that is based on the assumption that
agents make these inferences. However, the concept of REE is based on an additional
strong assumption that agents know (and therefore agree on) the function that speci￿es
the prices in each state of nature. (A state of nature speci￿es the real variables of the
economy, i.e., preferences and endowments.) As Radner (1979) has shown this strong
assumption leads to the strong result that in a generic economy with a ￿nite number
of states the only REE is a fully revealing equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium in which
each agent can infer from the prices all the information that any other agent has. This
conclusion is at odds both with intuition and real-world practice. To take just one
example, the daily volume of trade in foreign exchange is signi￿cantly larger than the
value of international trade, indicating that much of the former is speculative and based
on non-unanimous evaluation of the information embedded in prices.
In the current research the assumption that players know the price function is relaxed,
that is, we consider a situation where each agent may have a di⁄erent theory on how the
vector of prices which is observed has materialized and on what would have happened
in other states of nature. However, the assumption is maintained that each agent makes
inferences from the observed prices and furthermore assumes that other agents are doing
likewise. More precisely we ask: what is the set of outcomes that are consistent with
common knowledge of rationality and market clearing ?
To address this question we de￿ne an epistemic model of an economy with asymmetric
information. This model provides a complete description of the beliefs of each agent not
only on the relationship between states of nature and prices but also on the beliefs
of other agents. In this model consistency with common knowledge of rationality and
market clearing can be de￿ned in a precise way. Our main result, theorem 1, establishes
that under a mild quali￿cation an outcome (s;p); where s is a state of nature and p a
vector of prices, is consistent with common knowledge of rationality and market clearing
i⁄it is an Ex-Post Rationalizable outcome. Ex-Post Rationalizability is a solution notion
that is de￿ned directly in terms of the parameters that de￿ne the economy and does not
involve type spaces. The main advantage of Ex-Post Rationalizability is that it is easier
to compute. However, we view it as a derived notion, the fundamental concept being
2consistency with common knowledge of rationality and market clearing (henceforth, we
will often abbreviate and refer to this solution concept as CKRMC).
We use the characterization of theorem 1 to compute the set of prices that are con-
sistent with common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in a general class of
economies with two commodities. In this class of economies CKRMC manifests several
properties which stand in contrast to the full revelation property of REE: In particular,
we obtain that for a robust subset of these economies:
(a) There is a whole range of prices that are consistent with common knowledge of
rationality and market clearing in all the states of nature and therefore these prices do
not reveal any information.
(b) Re￿ning the knowledge of a positive measure of agents strictly shrinks the set of
CKRMC prices.
(c) Trade is consistent with common knowledge of rationality and market clearing
even when there is common knowledge that there are no mutual gains from it.
The general motivation for our work is related to the seminal contributions of Bern-
heim (1984) and Pearce (1984). Bernheim and Pearce pointed out that common knowl-
edge of rationality does not preclude the possibility that players have heterogenous beliefs
about the outcome of a game. In particular, common knowledge of rationality does not
imply a Nash equilibrium outcome. Bernheim and Pearce proposed the solution concept
of Rationalizability which is the outcome of a procedure in which strategies that are not
best responses to any beliefs are iteratively deleted. The study of the implications of ra-
tionalizability in competitive economies was pioneered by Guesnerie (1992)4. Guesnerie
analyzes a two-period economy with complete information that is based on the classi-
cal model of Muth (1961) and identi￿es conditions under which the only Rationalizable
outcome is the Rational Expectations Equilibrium outcome. (In Muth￿ s model Rational
Expectations Equilibrium means that each agent has a correct expectation about the
prices in the second period. This is very di⁄erent from the interpretation of REE in our
model where the object of analysis is a static economy with incomplete information and
the focus is on the information that prices reveal on the state of nature.)
There is some previous work which examines the implications of the assumptions of
rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information where play-
ers may have di⁄erent beliefs about the relationship between states of the economy and
prices. However the solution concepts that are proposed in these papers are di⁄erent
from consistency with common knowledge of rationality and market clearing. MacAllis-
ter (1990) and Dutta and Morris (1997) propose a solution concept, Belief Equilibrium,
which is stronger than CKRMC as it assumes that in addition to common knowledge of
rationality and market clearing there is also common knowledge of the belief of each player
on the joint distribution of prices and states of nature. As we show in section 3 this addi-
tional assumption restricts in a signi￿cant way the set of possible outcomes. Desgranges
4See also Guesnerie (2005) for additional papers on the eductive approach to the analysis of compet-
itive economies.
3and Guesnerie (2000)5 examine iterative deletion of weakly dominated demand strategies
in a simple example which is similar to example 1 in the current paper. The solution set
that they obtain is equal to the set of CKRMC and Ex-Post Rationalizable outcomes
that is obtained in the current paper. Desgranges (2004) also studies the implications
of Ex-Post Rationalizability (Desgranges calls it common knowledge equilibrium)6: The
focus in his work is on determining conditions under which Ex-Post Rationalizability
implies the REE outcome. In contrast our main interest is in characterizing the set of
Ex-Post Rationalizable outcomes in a general class of economies and demonstrating that
in contrast to the predictions of REE the properties (a)-(c) that were mentioned above
are consistent with common knowledge of rationality and market clearing. However, the
main di⁄erence between Desgranges and the current paper is that in Desgranges the
starting point is Ex-Post Rationalizability while in our work Ex-Post Rationalizability is
a derived notion which is justi￿ed only because it is a useful characterization of the fun-
damental solution concept - common knowledge of rationality and market clearing. This
is the content of our main result (theorem 1). To de￿ne common knowledge of rationality
and market clearing in a rigorous way we construct an epistemic model. Thus in terms
of the methodology of the analysis our work is related to the literature on the epistemic
foundations of solution concepts in game theory. The general goal of this literature is
to clarify the assumptions that underlie di⁄erent solution concepts. So for example, Tan
and Werlang (1988),7 used an epistemic model to establish that the set of outcomes that
are consistent with common knowledge of rationality in a strategic game is equivalent to
the set Rationalizable outcomes de￿ned by Bernheim and Pearce8.
Despite the fact that a system of interactive beliefs is at the heart of the eductive
approach there is only one other paper - Morris (1994)- that we are aware of which applies
the epistemic approach to the analysis of competitive economies. Morris shows that if
there is a common prior on the set of states of the world, where a state of the world
speci￿es not only the fundamentals of the economy (preferences and endowments) but
also the whole system of interactive beliefs, then common knowledge of rationality and
market clearing implies that the correspondence between states of the world and prices is
a Rational Expectations Equilibrium. By contrast we do not assume a common prior on
the states of the world and our interest (like in the rest of all the papers that were cited)
is in the correspondence between states of nature and prices (where a state of nature
speci￿es only the fundamentals).
We now present a simple example that motivates the discussion .
Example 1:
There are two commodities in the economy, X and M (money).
5See also Guesnerie (2002).
6A ￿rst draft of Desgranges paper was written before ours. We have developed the concept of EXPR
independently, before we learned of his work.
7See also Hu (2007).
8The literature which applies the epistemic approach to the analysis of game-theoretic solution con-
cepts is by now fairly extensive. Dekel and Gul (1997) and Battigalli and Bonanno (1999) provide
excellent overviews.
4The set of states is S = f1;3g:
The probability of each state is 0:5:
The set of agents is the interval [0;1]: There are two types of agents, I1 and I2. Agents
in I1 know the true state; agents in I2 do not know it. I1 = [0;￿] and I2 = (￿;1]: All the
agents have the same utility function and the same initial bundle. The utility function
is:
(1.1) u(x;m;s) = s ￿ log(x) + m
where x and m are the quantities of X and M respectively and s is the state.
The initial bundle consists of one unit of X and m units of M where m ￿ 3:
Let p be the price of a unit of X in units of M. It follows from the de￿nition of the
utility function in (1:1) that the demand for X of an agent who knows the true state is:
x = s
p





In this example for every ￿ > 0 there is only one REE; f￿ ,where f￿(s) = s: To
see that we, ￿rst, note that if f is a REE then f(1) 6= f(3). This follows because if
f(1) = f(3) = p then agents in I2 do not obtain any information about the true state




However, the demand of agents from I1 in state 1 is di⁄erent than their demand in
state 3 and therefore the aggregate demands are di⁄erent as well. Since the aggregate
amount of X is ￿xed this means that the market doesn￿ t clear in at least one of the states
and therefore f is not a REE: Thus, if f is a REE then f(1) 6= f(3): In this case agents
in I2 infer the state from the price and it follows from (1:2) that f(1) = 1 and f(3) = 3:
Thus, the only REE is a fully revealing equilibrium in which the price reveals the state.
Alternatively put, the only outcomes (p;s) (where p is a price and s 2 S is a state) that
are consistent with REE are (1;1) and (3;3):
We now show that if we relax the assumption that players know the price function
(and therefore agree on it) then there are other outcomes which are consistent with
common knowledge of rationality and market clearing. We call such outcomes CKRMC
outcomes:
Assume that the fraction of informed agents in the economy is ￿ = 1
6: De￿ne two price
functions f and g as follows:
f(1) = 2 g(1) = 1
f(3) = 3 g(3) = 2
5We will show that f and g are consistent with common knowledge of rationality and
hence the outcomes (2;1) and (2;3) are CKRMC outcomes.
Suppose that a fraction ￿ of the agents in I2 assign probability 3
4 to the event that
f is the price function and a probability 1
4 to the event that g is the price function, call
this belief ￿ theory A￿ : Assume that the other agents in I2 think that g is more likely, they
assign probability 1
4 to the event that f is the price function and probability 3
4 to the
event that the price function is g; call this belief ￿ theory B￿ :
What are the beliefs of di⁄erent agents in I2 about the true state when they observe
the price 2 ?
Since the prior assigns probability 0:5 to each state it is easy to see that agents in
I2 who believe in theory A assign probability 3
4 to the state 1 and probability 1
4 to the
state 3.9 Similarly, agents who believe in theory B assign probability 1
4 to the state 1
and probability 3
4 to the state 3.
It follows from (1:2) that the demand for X at price 2 of agents who believe in theory
A is ( 3
4 ￿ 1 + 1
4 ￿ 3 )/2 = 3
4 while the demand of agents who believe in theory B is
(3
4 ￿ 3 + 1
4 ￿ 1)/2 = 5
4.
Let x(￿;s;p) denote the aggregate demand for X in state s at price p when a pro-
portion ￿ of the agents in I2 believe in theory A and the rest of I2 believe in theory B:
We have
x(￿;1;2) = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ 3
4 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 5
4 + ￿ ￿ 1
2
x(￿;3;2) = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ 3
4 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 5
4 + ￿ ￿ 3
2
Let ￿f and ￿g be the numbers which equate demand and supply at price 2 in the









= 1: For ￿ = 1
6 we obtain ￿f = 0:3 and ￿g = 0:7:
Now we observe that when ￿f of the agents in I2 believe in theory A and 1 ￿ ￿f of
them believe in B then the function f speci￿es prices which clear the market. (We have
just seen that the price 2 clears the market in s = 1 and when the price is 3 everyone
assigns probability 1 to the state 3 and therefore the price 3 clears the market.) Similarly,
when ￿g of the agents in I2 believe in theory A (and the rest in B) the function g speci￿es
prices which clear the market.
In section 2 we present an epistemic model for an exchange economy with asymmetric
information and use it to de￿ne common knowledge of rationality and market clearing.
We then show how to formalize the analysis of example 1. With this formalization, it will
become explicit how there can be common knowledge that each agent in I2 entertains
either of the theories A and B; and that the price p = 2 is consistent with common
knowledge of rationality and market clearing in both states s = 1;3.
In section 3 we de￿ne the concept of Ex-Post Rationalizability and present theorem 1,
which establishes that under a mild quali￿cation an outcome is consistent with common
9Let PA(sjp = 2) denote the posterior that an agent who believes in theory A assigns to the state s
upon observing the price 2: Then PA(1jp = 2) = 0:75￿0:5
0:75￿0:5+0:25￿0:5 = 0:75
6knowledge of rationality and market clearing i⁄it is an Ex-Post Rationalizable outcome.
In section 4 we characterize the set of Ex-Post Rationalizable outcomes in a general class
of economies with two commodities and then use theorem 1 to derive implications on
CKRMC outcomes. The characterization which we obtain manifests the properties (a)-
(c) that were mentioned above. Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are delegated to the
appendix.
2 The Model
In this section we review the de￿nitions of an exchange economy with asymmetric in-
formation and the concept of Rational Expectations Equilibrium: We then present an
epistemic model of the economy and use it to de￿ne the concept of Consistency with
Common Knowledge of Rationality and Market Clearing (which we will often abbreviate
to CKRMC): An outcome (p;s); where p is a vector of prices and s is a state of nature, is
a CKRMC outcome if it is consistent with common knowledge of rationality and market
clearing: We then demonstrate how the epistemic model can be used to make the analysis
of example 1 complete and precise.
An economy with asymmetric information is de￿ned by:
1. I = [0;1]￿ The set of players (consumers).
2. X1;::::::;XK￿ K commodities.
3. S = fs1;:::::;sng￿ The set of states of nature.
4. ￿i￿ A partition on S that describes the information of player i:
￿i (s) ￿ S is the information that player i gets at the state s:
5. ￿i 2 4(S)￿The prior probability of agent i on S:10
6. ui : RK ￿ S ! R ￿ A V.N.M utility function for player i:
ui (x;s) is the utility of player i from a bundle
x 2 RK in the state s:
7. ei : S ! RK ￿ ei(s) is the initial bundle of player i at state s:
We assume that ei is measurable w.r.t ￿i and that
8s 2 S;
R
i ei(s)di￿ the aggregate supply in state s￿exists.
A price p is a vector p = (p1;::::pK￿1) where pk is the price of Xk. The price of XK
is normalized to be 1.
A price function f;f : S ! RK￿1; assigns to every state s a price f(s):
We let Li denote the set of signals of agent i: So, Li ￿ f￿i(s) : s 2 Sg:
A demand function for player i is a function zi, zi : Li ￿ RK￿1 ! RK; such that
zi(li;p) is in the budget set de￿ned by the price p and the initial endowment ei(li): ( ei(li)
is well de￿ned because ei is measurable w.r.t ￿i:)
10If ￿i = ￿ for every i 2 I then there is a common prior. However, our results do not require such an
assumption.
7It is assumed that the agents do not observe the supply and demand of the com-
modities, but only the prevailing price vector p 2 RK￿1: The standard solution notion
for economies with asymmetric information is Rational Expectations Equilibrium, REE:
A REE is a price function f such that for each state s the price f(s) clears the market
when every agent i exhibits a demand which is optimal w.r.t the price f(s) and the
information that is revealed by his private signal ￿i(s) and the fact that the price is f(s):
Formally,
De￿nition: A price function f is a REE if there exists a pro￿le of demand functions,
fzigi2I ; that satis￿es :
1. Rationality, 8s 2 S; zi(￿i(s);f(s)) is optimal w.r.t the price f(s) and the posterior
￿i(￿ j￿i(s) \ f￿1(f(s))):





A price function f is a fully revealing REE if f(s) 6= f(s0) when s 6= s0:
As we have pointed out in the introduction the concept of Rational Expectations
Equilibrium refers to a situation where all the agents know the price function. In par-
ticular, all the agents have the same belief regarding the relationship between the prices
and the states of nature. We are interested here in a solution concept that is akin to the
concept of Rationalizability in game theory. That is, we ask what is the set of outcomes
in the economy when agents may have heterogenous beliefs concerning the relationship
between prices and states and yet there is common knowledge of rationality and market
clearing ?
To address this question we now de￿ne an epistemic model in the spirit of Harsanyi
(1967-68) where we represent the choice and belief of each agent i by a type ti in a
measurable space Ti and the entire economic situation by a state of the world






Each type ti 2 Ti of agent i 2 I is associated with
1. its demand function zi [ti]: That is, for each observed price vector p0 2 R
K￿1
+ for









2 ￿ with t0
i = ti, zi [ti](￿i (s0);p0)




0 ￿ ei (￿i (s
0)) ￿ p
0
2. its ex-ante belief bi [ti] 2 ￿(￿) about the states of the world, having the property
that its marginal on the space of states of nature S is the agent￿ s prior ￿
margSbi [ti] = ￿i
8and that it knows its own type:

















We denote by bi [tij￿i (s0);p0] the interim belief of type ti for each combination of an
observed price p0 2 R
n￿1










2 ￿ with t0
i = ti.
A model M of the economy is a collection M = ((Ti;bi;zi)i2I;￿): The model M satis-





the aggregate demand is well de￿ned and equals the aggregate supply, which is well de-
￿ned as well: Z
I




Indeed, in a model M with this property not only does the market clear in each state
of the world, but also each agent is certain (i.e. assigns probability 1 to the event) that
the markets clear, each agent is certain that all agents are certain that the markets clear,
and so on ad in￿nitum.





2 ￿ the bundle consumed by each agent maximizes the agent￿ s
expected utility, i.e.




ui (xi;s)dbi [ti j￿i (s);p]
11
When both properties are satis￿ed we say that M satis￿es Common Knowledge of
Rationality and Market Clearing.
De￿nition 1 The price vector p is consistent with common knowledge of rationality
and market clearing (CKRMC) at the state of nature s 2 S, if there exists a model M










2 ￿: In such a case we also say that (p;s) is a CKRMC outcome.
Notice that this de￿nition is epistemic, in the sense that it relies on the existence of
a type space ￿ with particular properties, and not in terms of properties of the basic
11Clearly, what is relevant for the maximization problem is the marginal belief on S: So we could
equivalently write
zi [ti](￿i (s0);p0) 2 argmaxxi￿p￿ei(￿i(s))￿p
P
s2S
ui(xi;s)margSbi [ti j￿i (s0);p](s)
9asymmetric-information economy
￿
I;S;(￿i (￿);ei (￿i (￿);ui (￿;￿)))i2I
￿
. In section 3 our
aim will be to provide a characterization of Rationalizable Expectations prices in terms
of properties of the basic economy.
It is useful to see how the concepts of REE and Belief Equilibrium of Dutta and
Morris (1997) can be represented in our framework:
1. An REE f; f : S ! RK￿1; can be represented by a model where each agent i has
a single type b ti; ￿ =
￿






(s;f(s);(b ti)i2I) = ￿i (s):
2. A Belief Equilibrium (Dutta and Morris 1997) is de￿ned by a pro￿le of functions
(￿i)i2I; ￿i : S ! 4(RK￿1); where ￿i(s) is the conditional probability distribution on
prices given s of agent i: It is assumed that for s 2 S the distributions (￿i)i2I have
a common support. The pro￿le (￿i)i2I is a Belief Equilibrium if for every s 2 S and
p 2 RK￿1 such that ￿i(s)(p) > 0 for every i 2 I; the price p clears the market at the state
s (when each agent i chooses an optimal bundle w.r.t. his conditional probability on S
given his private signal and the price p:) Thus, a Belief Equilibrium is a more permissive
solution concept than REE because it allows di⁄erent agents to have di⁄erent beliefs on
the relationship between prices and states. On the other hand Belief Equilibrium is more
restrictive than CKRMC because it (implicitly) assumes that the beliefs of each agent
are common knowledge. In terms of our framework a Belief Equilibrium corresponds to
a model where each agent has just one type. To see that we now de￿ne a model that














(s;p;(b ti)i2I) = ￿i(s) ￿ ￿i(s)(p):
Thus, the de￿nition of CKRMC is more general than the de￿nition of Belief Equi-
librium because it allows di⁄erent types of a given agent to have di⁄erent beliefs over
types of the other agents. In particular agent i is uncertain about the beliefs of the other
agents. This is in line with our motivation to de￿ne the most permissive model that
is consistent with common knowledge of rationality and market clearing. Our approach
is consistent with the concept of Rationalizability that is de￿ned in the game theoretic
literature (Bernheim 1984 and Pearce 1984) . In particular, Rationalizability does not
assume that the beliefs of each player are known to the other players.
2.1 A formalization of example 1
We now describe example 1 in terms of our epistemic model.
The set of agents who are informed about the state of nature is I1 = [0;￿]; where
￿ = 1
6: The demand of an agent who knows that state of nature is determined by the
price and is not a⁄ected by his beliefs on the behavior of other agents. Thus, we can
omit the de￿nition of these beliefs from the description of our formal model and focus
only on the beliefs and demands of the uninformed agents.
10The set of uninformed agents is I2 = (￿;1]: The agents in I2 are divided into 10 cohorts
(￿;￿ + 0:1(1 ￿ ￿)];(￿ + 0:1(1 ￿ ￿);￿ + 0:2(1 ￿ ￿)]; :::;(￿ + 0:9(1 ￿ ￿);1]. In each state
of the world the types of all the agents within a given cohort are identical and completely
correlated, so we can e⁄ectively speak of 10 (representative) agents j = 1;:::;10; where
each agent r 2 (￿;1] is represented by a representative agent from her cohort.






Before we proceed with the formal de￿nitions we make some general comments on the
structure of the model. The beliefs of type tA
j and tB
j correspond respectively to theories
A and B that were described in the introduction. That is, type tA
j assigns probability 3
4
to the event that the pro￿le of types induces the price function f and a probability of 1
4
to the event that the pro￿le of types induces the function g; type tB
j assigns probability
3
4 to the event that the pro￿le of types induces the price function g and a probability
of 1
4 to the event that the pro￿le of types induces the function f: In addition each type
tx
j;x 2 fA;Bg;of each player assigns a probability 1
2 to each one of the two states of
nature, and the beliefs of tx
j on the state of nature are independent of his beliefs over the
possible pro￿le of types. In particular,
at the price p = 2;
￿ the (conditional) belief of type tA
j assigns marginal probability 3
4 to the state of
nature s = 1 and marginal probability 1
4 to the state of nature s = 3;
￿ the (conditional) belief of type tB
j assigns marginal probability 3
4 to the state of
nature s = 3 and marginal probability 1
4 to the state of nature s = 1.
In contrast, at the price p = s (for each of the two states of nature s = 1;3) each






(p)12 of type tx
j maximizes his expected utility w.r.t. his condi-
tional beliefs. Thus, following the calculation in the introduction we de￿ne the demand
of each type for the commodity X at the prices p = 1 and p = 3 to be one unit. The
demand of a type tA
j for X at the price p = 2 is 3
4 while type tB
j demands 5
4 units of X:
We now explain how to embed these types in a model which satis￿es common knowl-
edge of rationality and market clearing.
In the model there are altogether 20 type pro￿les denoted t
k;f;t
k;g for k = 1;:::;10:
(As will soon become clear, the pro￿le t
k;f(t
k;g) induces the price function f(g):) Each
12Since the agnets have no information about the state of nature we omit reference to the informational
signal in the de￿nition of the demand function.
11type pro￿le contains one type for each agent j = 1;:::;10; in a way that will be speci￿ed
below. In the state of nature s = 1 the possible prices are p = 1;2; in the state of nature


















Denote by ￿ and ￿ addition and subtraction modulo 10, respectively.
For each agent j the type tA
j is a member of 10 out of the 20 type pro￿les, and the
other type tB
j of agent j is a member of the remaining 10 pro￿les:
tA
j is in the type pro￿le t
k;f i⁄ 0 ￿ jk ￿ jj ￿ 1
tA
j is in the type pro￿le t
k;g i⁄ 2 ￿ jk ￿ jj ￿ 8
and similarly
tB
j is in the type pro￿le t
k;g i⁄ 0 ￿ jk ￿ jj ￿ 1
tB
j is in the type pro￿le t
k;f i⁄ 2 ￿ jk ￿ jj ￿ 8































Thus, in a pro￿le t
k;f( t
k;g) 30% of the population have beliefs that correspond to
theory A(B) and the other 70% have beliefs that correspond to theory B(A): As we have
seen in the introduction the pro￿le of demands that corresponds to a pro￿le t
k;f induces
the function f and the pro￿le of demands that correspond to a pro￿le t
k;g induces the
function g:
We turn now to the de￿nition of the beliefs. Recall that we want a type tA
j (tB
j ) to: (1)
assign a probability 3
4 to the event that the pro￿le of types induces the function f(g); (2)
to assign a probability 1
2 to each state of nature and, (3) the two beliefs (1) and (2) are to
be independent of one another. Consider a type tA
j ; a simple way of de￿ning his beliefs
so that he assigns a probability 3
4 to pro￿les of types that induce f and a probability 1
4
to pro￿les of types that induce g is to have him assign to each one of the three pro￿les
that induce f to which he belongs a probability of 3
4 ￿ 1
3 = 1
4 and similarly to have him




28: The beliefs of a type tB
j will be de￿ned in a similar way. With this in mind





















































































































for 2 ￿ jk ￿ jj ￿ 8
This completes the de￿nition of the beliefs of the agents￿types and hence the de￿nition
of ￿. In every state of the world ! 2 ￿ markets clear and each agent is choosing a
bundle which is optimal w.r.t. its conditional beliefs. It follows that the model M
satis￿es common knowledge of rationality and market clearing and therefore the price 2
is a CKRMC price in both states of nature.
3 A Characterization.
In this section we provide a characterization of CKRMC outcomes in terms of properties
of the basic economy. Speci￿cally we present the concept of Ex￿Post Rationalizability
13 and then show (theorem 1) that every CKRMC outcome is an Ex-Post Rationalizable
outcome and that under a mild quali￿cation the opposite implication is also true. We
then use this characterization to compute the set of CKRMC outcomes in example 1.
De￿nition: A price p is Ex ￿ Post Rationalizable w.r.t to a set of states b S ￿ S if
for every s 2 b S there exists a pro￿le of probabilities f￿s
igi2I on b S , ￿s
i 2 4(b S \ ￿i(s));
and a pro￿le of demands fxs
igi2I , xs
i 2 RK; such that:
1. For every i 2 I xs
i is an optimal bundle at the price p w.r.t ￿s
i:







We will say that the price p can be supported in the state s by the beliefs ￿s = f￿s
igi2I
on b S if there exists a pro￿le of demands xs = fxs
igi2I such that the conditions 1. and 2.
above are satis￿ed.
13As we have pointed out in the introduction the concept of Ex-Post Rationalizability was ￿rst studied
in Degranges (2004).
13The idea that underlies the concept of Ex-Post Rationalizability is that if p is Ex-Post
Rationalizable w.r.t b S then b S is a set of states in which p could be a clearing price because
for every s 2 b S there is a pro￿le of beliefs on b S; f￿s
igi2I ; which is consistent with the
private information of the players and which rationalizes demands that clear the markets
at p. (The belief ￿s
i; in turn, is possible for player i because p can be a clearing price in
every s 2 b S:)
De￿nition: An outcome (p;s) is Ex￿Post Rationalizable (alternatively, p is Ex￿
Post Rationalizable in s) if there exists a set of states b S such that s 2 b S and p is
Ex ￿ Post Rationalizable w.r.t b S:
Let S(p) be the set of all states such that (p;s) is Ex-Post Rationalizable: It is easy
to see that p is Ex-Post Rationalizable w.r.t S(p) and that S(p) is the maximal set of
states w.r.t which p is Ex-Post Rationalizable.
The concept of Ex-post Rationalizability does not specify a complete description of
the beliefs of the agents. In particular it does not specify (as REE and Belief Equilibrium
do) the joint probability distribution of an agent on the state of nature and prices. It
also does not specify the interactive beliefs, in particular, what agent i believes about the
beliefs of other agents. Thus, one cannot tell whether and under what conditions an Ex-
Post Rationalizable outcome is an outcome that is consistent with common knowledge of
rationality and market clearing. Indeed, as we will see (example 2), there are economies
where there exist Ex-Post Rationalizable outcomes that are not CKRMC outcomes.
Despite these fundamental di⁄erences in the de￿nitions of the two concepts our main
result, theorem 1, establishes that under a mild quali￿cation an outcome is a CKRMC
outcome i⁄ it is an Ex-Post Rationalizable outcome.
Theorem 1:
a. If (p;s) is a CKRMC outcome then (p;s) is Ex-Post Rationalizable:
b. Let E be an economy in which there is a fully revealing Rational Expectations
Equilibrium, e f. Let p be a price such that p = 2 [s2S e f(s): Then (p;s) is a CKRMC
outcome i⁄ (p;s) is Ex-Post Rationalizable.
Remarks:
1. The set of economies in which there exists a fully revealing Rational Expectations
Equilibrium is generic. For this set theorem 1 provides a characterization of CKRMC
outcomes modulo outcomes which involve prices that are in the range of every fully
revealing Rational Expectation Equilibrium:14
2. The concept of Ex-Post Rationalizability is de￿ned in a way which is independent
of the subjective priors - (￿i)i2I￿ on S: Similarly, if a price function f is a fully revealing
Rational Expectations Equilibrium for some pro￿le of subjective priors on S it is a fully
14There are economies in which the set of fully revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium is not a
singleton.
14revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium for every pro￿le of priors. It follows that
under the condition speci￿ed in part b of theorem 1 if (p;s) is a CKRMC outcome for
some pro￿le of subjective priors with full support on S then it is a CKRMC outcome
for every such pro￿le of priors. In particular, if (p;s) is a CKRMC outcome for some
pro￿le of subjective priors with full support then for every ￿ 2 4(S) with full support
(p;s) is a CKRMC outcome for the economy where ￿ is a common prior.
3. There can be CKRMC outcomes which do not satisfy the condition formulated
in part b. of theorem 1. (See example 3 in the appendix.) We do not have a general nec-
essary and su¢ cient condition for an Ex-Post Rationalizable outcome to be a CKRMC
outcome. It is clear that such a condition would be cumbersome. However, the ideas
that underlie the proof of theorem 1 can be used to establish theorem 2, which will be
useful for our discussion in section 4.
Theorem 2:
Let E be an economy such that in each state s 2 S there are at least 2n prices that
are Ex-Post Rationalizable. Then an outcome (p;s) is a CKRMC outcome i⁄ it is an
Ex-Post Rationalizable outcome.
We now use theorem 1 to compute the set of CKRMC outcomes in example 1. Let Ps
, s = 1;3; denote the set of prices that are Ex-Post Rationalizable in s: We will compute
Ps and conclude, using theorem 1, that Ps is also the set of CKRMC prices in the state
s: Let P(b S) denote the set of prices that are Ex-Post Rationalizable w.r.t the set of states
b S, b S ￿ S: It follows from the de￿nitions that: Ps = [b S;s2b SP(b S): In our example:
(3.1) P1 = P(f1g) [ P(f1;3g)
(3.2) P3 = P(f3g) [ P(f1;3g)
P(f1g) = 1 and P(f3g) = 3 because 1 and 3 are the prices which clear the markets
in the states 1 and 3 respectively when everyone knows the state. We now compute
P(f1;3g): Let Ps(f1;3g) denote the set of prices that can clear the markets in state
s;s = 1;3; when players in I2 may have any pro￿le of beliefs on f1;3g: It follows from
the de￿nition of P(f1;3g) that
(3.3) P(f1;3g) = P1(f1;3g) \ P3(f1;3g):
We claim that P1(f1;3g) = [1;3 ￿ 2￿]: This follows because the price 1 clears the
market when every agent in I2 assigns probability 1 to the state 1(every agent in I1
knows that the state is 1.) Clearly, the aggregate demand for X and therefore its price
are minimal when everyone assigns the state 1 probability 1. Similarly, the price 3 ￿ 2￿
clears the market when every agent in I2 assigns probability 1 to the state 3 and therefore
the maximal point in P1(f1;3g) is 3 ￿ 2￿: It is easy to see that for every 1￿ p ￿ 3 ￿ 2￿
there is a probability ￿(p) such that if every agent in I2 assigns probability ￿(p) to the
state 3 then p clears the market. The set P3(f1;3g) is computed in a similar way. When
each agent in I2 assigns the state 1 probability 1 the clearing price is 1+2￿: When agents
in I2 assign the state 3 probability 1 the clearing price is 3. It follows that P3(f1;3g) =
[1 + 2￿;3]: From (3.3) we obtain that for ￿ ￿ 0:5 P(f1;3g) = [1 + 2￿;3 ￿ 2￿]: For ￿ > 0:5
15P(f1;3g) = ;: From (3.1) and (3.2) we have that for ￿ ￿ 0:5 P1 = f1g [ [1 + 2￿;3 ￿ 2￿]
and P3 = f3g [ [1 + 2￿;3 ￿ 2￿] and for ￿ > 0:5 P1 = f1g and P3 = f3g: It follows from
theorem 1 that the di⁄erence between the set Ps and the set of CKRMC prices in s;
s = 1;3; is at most the price s. Now, s is the Rational Expectations Equilibrium price in
the state s and therefore s is a CKRMC price at s: It follows that the sets Ps; s = 1;3;
that we have computed are the sets of CKRMC prices in the respective states.
The solution of the example is interesting in several ways: First, when ￿ is smaller
than 0:5 there is a whole range of prices that are CKRMC prices in both states. Second,
the set of CKRMC prices (i.e., P1 and P3) depends on ￿ (the fraction of agents who
know the true state) in an intuitive way. As ￿ increases the set Ps shrinks and when
more than 0.5 of the population is informed (￿ > 0:5) the only CKRMC price at a state
s is the Rational Expectation Equilibrium price: Thus, when ￿ > 0:5 the assumption of
rationality and knowledge of rationality is su¢ cient to select the Rational Expectations
Equilibrium15 (without assuming a-priori that the price function is known).
Consider now the case where all the agents have the same initial endowment and
￿ < 0:5: In this case consistency with common knowledge of rationality and market
clearing allows for trade despite the fact that it is common knowledge that there are
no gains from trade (all the agents have the same utility function and the same initial
endowment) and furthermore it is common knowledge that trade bene￿ts agents in I1 at
the expense of some of the agents in I2: The point is that when agents may have di⁄erent
beliefs and when the fraction of agents who are uninformed is high enough, common
knowledge of rationality does not preclude the possibility that each uninformed agent is
optimistic and believes that he is making a pro￿t at the expense of other uniformed agents.
The result that speculative trade is consistent with common knowledge of rationality and
market clearing hinges on the following two properties of CKRMC : (1) Di⁄erent agents
may have di⁄erent beliefs on the set of price functions. (2) Each agent does not know
the beliefs of the other agents. Property (2) distinguishes CKRMC from the solution
concept that is studied by MacAllister(1990) and Dutta and Morris(1997) and which
is based on the assumption that the beliefs of the players are common knowledge. To
appreciate the importance of property (2) we note that when ￿ > 0 it is impossible to
obtain trade, even with di⁄erent beliefs, if these beliefs are common knowledge. The
reason for this impossibility is that the beliefs of the uninformed agents determine their
demands. So if an agent i in I2 knows these beliefs he knows the aggregate demand of
the uninformed agents. Since the aggregate amount of X is known, agent i can infer
the aggregate demand of the informed agents. However, the aggregate demand of the
informed agents reveals the state. Thus, if an uninformed agent i knows the beliefs of the
other agents and observes the price p he can infer the true state and if everyone infers
15Since there are just two states in our example the set of outcomes that is consistent with (just)
rationality and knowledge of rationality equals the set of outcomes that are consistent with common
knowledge of rationality. In particular, Ps(f1;3g) is the set of prices that are consistent with rational
behavior in state s: When ￿ > 0:5 P1(f1;3g) and P3(f1;3g) are disjoint and therefore an agent who
knows that all the other agents are behaving rationally can infer the state from the price.
16the true state there is no trade. Indeed for every ￿ > 0 the unique REE is the only
belief equilibrium in the models of MacAllister and Dutta and Morris.
We now turn to an example demonstrating two issues: First, the possibility of non-
existence of a CKRMC outcome. Second, the possibility of a di⁄erence between the
set of CKRMC outcomes and the set of Ex-Post Rationalizable outcomes: The example
is similar to examples of non-existence of Rational Expectations Equilibrium that were
given by Kreps(1977) and Allen(1986). However, the argument which establishes non-
existence of a CKRMC outcome is somewhat more involved. In particular, example 3
in the appendix demonstrates that non-existence of a Rational Expectations Equilibrium
does not imply non-existence of CKRMC outcomes.
Example 2: The example is a variation on example 1.
There are two states, S = f1;2g: The probability of each state is 0.5. The set of
agents is I = [0;1] where agents in I1 = [0;￿] know the true state and agent in I2 = (￿;1]
don￿ t know it. The utility of an agent in I1 is u1(x;m;s) = as ￿ log(x) + m: The utility
of an agent in I2 is u2(x;m;s) = bs ￿ log(x) + m: The aggregate amount of X is 1 and
the number of units of M that each agent has exceeds Maxfas;bs : s = 1;2g: All this
implies that if p is the price of X in units of M then the demand for X of an agent in I1
in state s is as




We make the following assumptions:
(3.4) a1 > a2 and b1 < b2
(3.5) There exists a number b p such that
a1 ￿ ￿ + b1(1 ￿ ￿) = a2 ￿ ￿ + b2(1 ￿ ￿) = b p
We claim that under these assumptions the set of CKRMC outcomes is empty.
To prove this we compute, ￿rst, the set of outcomes that are Ex-Post Rationalizable
outcomes: Let ￿ = f￿igi2I2 be a pro￿le of probabilities on S; (agents in I1 assign proba-
bility 1 to the true state), and let xp
s(￿) denote the aggregate demand for X in the state
s at the price p when the pro￿le is ￿: Since b1<b2 the demand of each agent in I2 is
increasing in the probability which he assigns to the state 2. It follows that for every












Now we claim that (3.5)-(3.7) and the fact that the aggregate supply of X is 1 imply
that the only outcomes that are Ex-Post Rationalizable are (b p;1) and (b p;2): To see that
we, ￿rst, observe that b p is the clearing price in state s when every agent in I2 assigns
the state s probability 1 and therefore (b p;1) and (b p;2) are Ex-Post Rationalizable. Now,
17assume by contradiction that there exists p 6= b p such that (p;1) is Ex-Post Rationalizable.
It follows from (3.6) that if p < b p then for every pro￿le of probabilities ￿ it is the case
that x
p
1(￿) > 1;but this is impossible because the aggregate amount of X is 1. If p > b p
then (3.7) implies that for every pro￿le ￿ it is the case that x
p
2(￿) < 1 which means that
p cannot be a clearing price in state 2. It follows that p cannot be Ex-Post Rationalizable
w.r.t the set S: Clearly, p cannot be Ex-Post Rationalizable w.r.t f1g and therefore we
have obtained a contradiction. A similar argument establishes that b p is the only price
that is Ex-Post Rationalizable in the state 2. It follows from part a. of theorem 1 that
the only possible CKRMC outcomes are (b p;1) and (b p;2):
We now show that (b p;1) is not a CKRMC outcome. (The proof that (b p;2) is not
a CKRMC outcome is identical.) Assume by contradiction that there exists a model
M that is consistent with common knowledge of rationality and market clearing and
a state ! 2 ￿ such that ! = (1; b p;(ti)i2I): It follows that for almost every16 i 2 I2;
margSbi [ti] assigns probability 1 to the state 1. (To see that recall that the demand of




b p where ￿i(s) is the posterior probability that
i assigns to the state s: If margSbi [ti] assigns a positive probability to state 2 then the
demand of agent i for X at b p is greater than
b1
b p . If there is a positive measure of such
agents then it follows from (3.6) and (3.5) that the aggregate demand for X is higher
than one unit, but that is impossible because the aggregate amount of X is one unit.)
Let !0 2 ￿ be another state of the world such that !0 = (2;p;(t0
i)i2I): Since b p is the
only CKRMC price we must have p = b p but now again we obtain that for almost every
i 2 I2 margSbi [t0
i] assigns probability 1 to the state 2. (Otherwise, an argument which is
similar to the one we just gave implies that at the state s = 2 the aggregate demand for
X at the price b p is smaller than one unit.) However, this implies that for almost every
i 2 I2 margSbi [ti] 6=margSbi [t0
i]; but this is impossible because we must have
margSbi [ti] =margSbi [t0
i] = ￿i:
4 Common Knowledge of Rationality and Market
Clearing in economies with two commodities
In this section we characterize the set of Ex-Post Rationalizable outcomes in a class of
economies with two commodities, X and M; in which the utility function of each agent
is quasi-linear w.r.t M: We then apply theorems 1 and 2 to obtain implications regarding
the set of CKRMC outcomes. The class of economies that are studied includes example
1. Here, however, we allow for any ￿nite number of states of nature and any ￿nite
number of types of agents where a type is characterized by a utility function and an
16That is, for every i 2 I2 except possibly for a set of agents of measure zero.
18information partition. We provide a characterization of the set of prices, Ps;that are Ex-
Post Rationalizable in each state s 2 S: This characterization is useful in several ways.
First, it extends the qualitative results which were obtained for example 1 to this more
general class of economies. In particular, the characterization implies that for a robust17
class of economies there is a whole segment of prices that are Ex-Post Rationalizable in
every state and therefore the observation of a price in this segment does not exclude any
state. Second, we derive a corollary on the e⁄ect of re￿ning the knowledge of agents on
the set of Ex-Post Rationalizable prices in a given state. Finally, the characterization
result makes it possible to solve the system, i.e., compute Ps for every s 2 S; by a
simple procedure which involves (only) n2 calculations of Walrasian equilibrium prices in
complete information economies, where n is the number of states. We turn now to the
formal description.
The commodities are denoted by X and M:
The set of states is S = f1;:::;ng:
The set of agents is I = [0;1]: There are L types of agents, so I = [L
l=1Il and Ij\Ik = ;
for j 6= k: We let ￿l denote the measure of the set Il: All the agents in Il; 1 ￿ l ￿ L; have
the same utility function ul(x;m;s) = ul(x;s)+m; the same initial bundle el = (xl;ml);
and the same information partition ￿l: We make the following assumptions:
(1) The function ul; as a function of x; is strictly monotonic, strictly concave, and twice
continuously di⁄erentiable. For every s 2 S limx!0u0
l(x;s) = 1 and limx!1u0
l(x;s) = 0:
Also, ml > 0 for every l = 1;:::L:
(2) For every x 2 R; s;s0 2 S; such that s > s0 u0(x;s) > u0(x;s0): That is, the
marginal utility from X increases in s:
(3) The elements of ￿l are segments of states. That is if ￿ 2 ￿l then there exist s
and s, s > s; such that ￿ = fs : s ￿ s ￿ sg:
Let p 2 R denote the price of a unit of X in terms of units of M:
For every b s 2 S and b S ￿ S such that b s 2 b S de￿ne P(b s; b S) to be the set of all the
prices p with the following property: there exists a pro￿le of probabilities ￿ = (￿i)i2I;
￿i 2 4(￿i(b s) \ b S); such that p is an equilibrium price w.r.t ￿: Thus, P(b s; b S) is the set
of equilibrium prices that can be generated in b s when the support of the probability
distribution of an agent i is contained in b S and in his information set in the state b s:
De￿ne:
P(b S) ￿ \b s2b SP(b s; b S) and
Pb s ￿ [b s2b SP(b S)
Thus, P(b S) is the set of prices that are Ex-Post Rationalizable w.r.t the set b S and Pb s
is the set of prices that are Ex-Post Rationalizable w.r.t the state b s:
We now characterize the set P(b s; b S):
De￿ne p(b s; b S) to be the equilibrium price implied by the pro￿le ￿ = f￿igi2I where
17A set of economies is robust if it contains an open set. In the appendix we de￿ne a metric on the
space of economies.
19￿i assigns probability 1 to the maximal state in the set ￿i(b s) \ b S:18 Similarly, we de￿ne








probability 1 to the minimal state in the set ￿i(b s) \ b S:
Proposition 1: Let b s 2 S and b S ￿ S such that b s 2 b S then P(b s; b S) =
h
p(b s; b S);p(b s; b S)
i
.
The intuition behind this result is very simple. Since the marginal utility from X
increases with s (assumption 2) then for any price p the demand of each agent i for X
increases when i assigns a higher probability to a higher state. It follows that for any
price p the maximal aggregate demand for X; in the state b s when beliefs are restricted
to the set b S; is obtained when each agent i assigns probability 1 to the maximal state
in ￿i(b s) \ b S: It follows that p(b s; b S) is the maximal price in P(b s; b S): Similarly p(b s; b S) is
the minimal price in P(b s; b S): The result that every price p; p(b s; b S) ￿ p ￿ p(b s; b S); can
be obtained as an equilibrium price for some pro￿le of probabilities ￿p follows from the
continuity of the equilibrium price in the beliefs. The formal proof of the proposition is
given in the appendix.
Let s,s 2 S; s<s: De￿ne [s;s] ￿ fs : s ￿ s ￿ sg:
The following proposition is a consequence of proposition 1.
Proposition 2:





In words, P([s;s]) is the segment of prices where the lowest (highest) price is the lowest
(highest) equilibrium price in the maximal (minimal) state in [s;s] when the support of
the probability of agent i is contained in ￿i(s)\ [s;s] ( ￿i(s)\ [s;s]):
(b) Ps = [s2[s;s]P [s;s]:
The proof of the proposition is in the appendix.
The characterization of Ex-Post Rationalizable outcomes in proposition 2 has several
implications for CKRMC outcomes: First, it follows from theorem 1 that for a generic
set of economies proposition 2 provides a characterization of CKRMC outcomes modulo
outcomes which involve the REE equilibrium prices. Second, it follows from proposition
2 that Ps contains a segment of prices whenever there exist states s and s, s￿ s ￿ s;
such that p(s;[s;s]) > p(s;[s;s]): In the appendix we use this result to prove that the
set of economies in which there is a segment of prices that are Ex-Post Rationalizable
in every state is robust. Theorem 2 implies that for an economy in this subclass the set
of Ex-Post Rationalizable outcomes equals the set of CKRMC outcomes without any
quali￿cation.
The characterization that is obtained in proposition 2 extends the qualitative prop-
erties of the solution of example 1. First, as we have pointed out, there exists a robust
subclass of economies in which there is a whole segment of prices that are Ex-Post Ra-
tionalizable in every state. Thus, the observation of a price in this segment does not
18The existence and uniquness of p(b s; b S) is proved in the sequel.
19If p(s;[s;s]) < p(s;[s;s]) then the RHS is the empty set.
20exclude any state. Another implication of proposition 2 has to do with the e⁄ect of re￿n-
ing the knowledge of agents on the set of Ex-Post Rationalizable prices. To describe this
implication we need to introduce some additional notation. Given a subset of agents I0
we want to consider the economy EI0 which is obtained from the original economy E by
re￿ning the knowledge of agents in I0 so that each agent in I0 has complete information
on S: We will denote di⁄erent terms which refer to EI0 by adding a superscript I0: In
particular, the set of prices that are Ex-Post Rationalizable in a state s in the economy
EI0 will be denoted by P I0
s :
Proposition 3: Let s 2 S be a state such that Ps strictly contains the (singleton)
set P(fsg): For any number ￿ > 0 there exists a set of agents I0 of a measure that is
smaller than ￿ such that P I0
s is strictly contained in Ps: 20
The proof of the proposition is in the appendix.
Finally, the characterization in proposition 2 implies that it is possible to solve the
economy, i.e., compute Ps for every s 2 S; by a procedure which involves only n2 calcu-
lations of Walrasian equilibrium prices. To see this we note that it follows from the ￿rst
part of proposition 2 that for every s;s 2 S; s<s; the computation of the set P([s;s])
involves two calculations of Walrasian equilibrium prices (i.e., p(s;[s;s]) and p(s;[s;s])):
In addition for every s 2 S we calculate P(fsg) = P([s;s]); that is, the Walrasian equi-
librium price in the complete information economy that is de￿ned by the state s: All this
involves 2 ￿
n(n￿1)
2 + n = n2 calculations of Walrasian equilibrium prices. Now, by the
second part of proposition 2 every set Ps is just a union of the sets P([s;s]) for s;s 2 S
such that s 2 [s;s]:
5 Conclusion
This research was motivated by the following question: What is the set of outcomes that
are consistent with common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in an exchange
economy with asymmetric information ? To address this question we have de￿ned an
epistemic model for the economy. This model provides a complete description not only
of the beliefs of each agent on the relationship between states of nature and prices but
also of the whole system of interactive beliefs. The main result, theorem 1, provides a
characterization of outcomes that are consistent with common of rationality and market
clearing in terms of a solution notion - Ex ￿ Post Rationalizability - that is de￿ned
directly in terms of the parameters that de￿ne the economy. We then applied theorem
1 to characterize the set of CKRMC outcomes in a general class of economies with two
commodities. We have pointed out several properties of CKRMC that stand in contrast
to the full revelation property of REE: In particular, propositions 1 and 2 imply that in a
robust class of economies, (a) There is a whole range of prices that are CKRMC in every
state (and therefore do not reveal the true state). (b) The set of CKRMC outcomes
20It is easy to see that weak containement is implied by any re￿nement of the knowledge of agents.
21is sensitive to the amount of information in the economy. (c) Trade is consistent with
CKRMC even when there is common knowledge that there are no mutual gains from it.
226 Appendix
6.1 The Proof of Theorem 1
We start with part a.
Let (b p;b s) be a CKRMC outcome. Let M be a model that satis￿es common knowl-
edge of rationality and market clearing and b ! 2 ￿ a state of the world such that
b ! = (b s; b p;(b ti)i2I): We have to show that (b p;b s) is an Ex-Post Rationalizable outcome:
De￿ne
b S = fsj9! 2 ￿ s.t. ! = (s; b p;(ti)i2Ig
We claim that b p is Ex-Post Rationalizable w.r.t the set b S: The proof is simple: let ! 2
￿ be a state of the world such that ! = (s; b p;(b ti)i2I): Clearly, for every i 2 I the support of
the probability distribution margSbi [ti j￿i(s); b p]is contained in b S: Also, since M satis￿es
common knowledge of rationality and market clearing the demand zi [ti](￿i(s); b p) of each
ti is optimal w.r.t. margSbi [ti j￿i(s); b p] and the aggregate demand equals the aggregate
supply. It follows that the pro￿le of probabilities fmargSbi [ti j￿i(s); b p]gi2I supports the
price b p at the state s: Since this holds for every s 2 b S; b p is Ex-Post Rationalizable w.r.t.
b S: Since b s 2 b S we obtain that b p is an Ex-Post Rationalizable price at b s:
We turn now to part b.
Let (b p;b s) be an Ex-Post Rationalizable outcome. For s 2 S(b p) we let ￿s = f￿s
igi2I and
xs = fxs
igi2I denote respectively the pro￿les of beliefs and demands that support the price
b p w.r.t. S(b p): For s 2 S we let ps and ys = (ys
i)i2I denote respectively the price vector
e f(s) and a pro￿le of demands for the agents that constitute a Walrasian equilibrium in
the complete information economy where the state s is common knowledge. For s 2 S(b p)
and i 2 I we de￿ne a type ts






i p = b p
ys
i p = ps for some s 2 S
We note that the pro￿le of demand functions (zi [ts




b p s = s
ps s 6= s








Thus, a state of the world (s; b p;(ts
i)i2I) is a state of the world where the state of nature
is s and the demands of the agents clear the market at the price b p: We now construct ￿
23so that we can assign to each type ts
i; s 2 S(b p);i 2 I; beliefs that rationalize his demand
function, zi [ts
i]: To do this we need the following de￿nitions and lemma 1.
De￿ne: F = ffs js 2 S(b p)g: Let ￿ be a probability distribution on S and let
￿ be a probability distribution on F: We let ￿ ￿ ￿ denote the product probability
distribution over S ￿ F: For S0 ￿ S and a price p such that the event (S0;p) =
f(s;f)js 2 S0;f 2 F;f(s) = pg has a positive ￿ ￿ ￿ probability we let ￿ ￿ ￿(￿jS0;p)
denote the conditional of ￿ ￿ ￿ on (S0;p): Finally, we remind that ￿i denotes the prior
probability of agent i on S and that ￿i has a full support.
Lemma 1:
For every s 2 S and i 2 I there exists a probability distribution on F;￿
fs
i ; such that:
(a) For every s 2 S margS￿i ￿ ￿
fs
i (￿j(￿i(s);ps)) assigns probability 1 to the state s
and margS￿i ￿ ￿
fs
i (￿j(￿i(s); b p)) = ￿s
i
(b) For every s = 2 ￿i(s) ￿
fs
i (fs) = 0 :
The proof of lemma 1 is given in the end of the section
Note that property (a) implies that the beliefs ￿
fs
i rationalize the demand function
zi [ts
i]: That is, for every event (￿i(s);p) that has a positive ￿i￿￿
fs
i probability the bundle
zi [ts
i](￿i(s);p) is optimal w.r.t. margS￿i ￿ ￿
f
i (￿j(￿i;p): We now construct ￿ so that we
can assign to each type ts
i beliefs that are induced by the beliefs ￿i ￿￿
fs
i that satisfy the
properties de￿ned in lemma 1: These beliefs rationalize his demand - zi [ts
i].
For s 2 S(b p) and s0 2 ￿i(s) we let (ts0
￿i;ts
i) denote the pro￿le of types where the type
of agent i is ts
i and the type of an agent j 6= i is ts0
j : We note that the pro￿le (ts0
￿i;ts
i)
induces the demand function fs0: To see that observe that:
(a) Since there is a continuum of agents the aggregate demand in the economy is not
e⁄ected by the demand of the single agent i.







j6=i clears the markets at the prices
speci￿ed by fs0:











i)js;s0 2 S(b p);s0 2 ￿i(s);s 6= s0;i 2 I
￿
Now, de￿ne
￿ = ￿1 [ ￿2:
We note that ￿1 is a set of states of the world in which the price is b p while ￿2 is a
set of states of the world in which the price fully reveals the state of nature.
24The demand function of type ts
i￿ zi [ts























We note that ￿
s;i
1 ￿ ￿1 and ￿
s;i
2 ￿ ￿2: Thus, ￿
s;i
1 is a set of states of the world in
which the price is b p while ￿
s;i
2 is a set of states of the world in which the price fully reveals













To understand this construction we observe that the belief of ts
i on S is ￿i and
his beliefs on the types of the other players is de￿ned by ￿
fs




i (fs0) to the event that the pro￿le of types of the other players is ts0
￿i: Now,
since the pro￿le of types (ts0
￿i;ts
i) induces the price function fs0 the posterior probability of
ts
i on S at an event (￿i(s);p) that is consistent with ￿ is margS￿i ￿￿
fs
i (￿j(￿i(s);p)) and
therefore the beliefs of ts
i rationalize his demand function. We have thus both explained
the construction of M and proved that M satis￿es common knowledge of rationality and
market clearing. If follows that (b p;b s) is a CKRMC outcome.
We have completed the proof of theorem 1 given lemma 1. The proof of lemma 1
relies on lemma 2.
Lemma 2:
Let ￿1;:::;￿m be m positive numbers and let ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿m) be a probability vector.
There exists a probability vector ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿m) which solves the following system of
equations:
￿k =
￿k ￿ ￿k Pm
j=1 ￿j ￿ ￿j
k = 1;:::;m
Proof of lemma 2:
First, we assume w.l.o.g that ￿k > 0 for every k because if this is not the case we
de￿ne ￿j = 0 if ￿j = 0 and proceed to prove the lemma for the set fk : ￿k > 0g:
Second, multiplying the equations by the denominator and subtracting the RHS from
the LHS gives a system of m homogeneous linear equations in ￿1;::;￿m that are linearly
dependent (the sum of all the equations is zero). Therefore there exists a solution to this
system, ￿ = (￿1;::::;￿m) that is di⁄erent from zero:
25Third, if ￿ is a solution and c is a constant then c ￿ ￿ is also a solution.
Finally, since ￿k > 0 for all k = 1;:::;m then if ￿ is a solution then ￿1;::::;￿m all have
the same sign which is the sign of the denominator.
It follows from all this that there is a solution b ￿ to the system that is a probability
vector because if ￿ is some solution there is a constant c such that c ￿ ￿ is a probability
vector.
Proof of lemma 1:
We map lemma 2 to the proof of lemma 1 as follows: Suppose that S(b p) \ ￿i(s) is
the set f1;::;mg: For s 2 f1;::;mg de￿ne ￿s ￿ ￿i(s); the prior probability that agent i
assigns to the state s; and ￿s ￿ ￿s
i(s); the probability of the state s according to ￿s
i: We
claim that if for s 2 f1;::;mg we de￿ne ￿
fs
i (fs) to be ￿s so that the equations in the
statement of lemma 2 are satis￿ed then property (a) is satis￿ed (property (b) is satis￿ed
as well because the probability of a price function di⁄erent from f1;:::;fm is zero.) To
see that (a) is satis￿ed we observe that margS￿i ￿ ￿
fs
i (￿j￿i(s);ps) assigns probability 1
to the state s21 and that Bayesian updating implies that for s = 1;:::;m
margS￿i ￿ ￿
fs









and therefore by lemma 2 margS￿i￿ ￿
fs
i (s j￿i(s); b p) = ￿s
i(s):
6.2 Proof of theorem 2
Part (a) of theorem 1 establishes that if (p;s) is a CKRMC outcome then it is also an
Ex-post Rationalizable outcome.
Consider now the other direction. We will prove the theorem by constructing a model
that is consistent with common knowledge of rationality and market clearing such that
for every price function f; f : S ! RK￿1; that satis￿es:
(1) f(s) 2 Ps for every s 2 S and (2) f(s) 6= f(s0) 8s;s0 2 S there exists a pro￿le of
types tf which induces the price function f: (We remind that Ps denotes the set of prices
that are Ex-Post Rationalizable at the state s:)
First, we need some notation and de￿nitions. For every s 2 S and p 2 Ps we
let ￿s;p = (￿
s;p
i )i2I and xs;p = (x
s;p
i )i2I denote respectively the pro￿les of beliefs and
demands that support the price p at the state s: For i 2 I and p 2 Ps we let ys
i(p) denote
an optimal bundle for agent i at the state s (i.e., when i assigns probability 1 to the state
s) at the price p: De￿ne now,




(s0))js0 2 S;s￿ 2 f1;::;mg
￿
with the price ps:
22The fact that Bayesian updating is given by the equation above relies on the assumption that b p 6= ps
for every s 2 S: This is the only point where this assumption is used.
26F = ff jf(s) 2 Ps and f(s) 6= f(s0) 8s 6= s0g
With every f 2 F associate a function f￿ 2 F such that f(s) 6= f￿(s0) 8s;s0 2 S: We
note that the assumption that jPsj ￿ 2n 8s 2 S ensures the existence of such a function
f￿: Lemma 3 below plays a key role in the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 3: For every f 2 F and i 2 I there exists a probability measure ￿
f
i on F
such that for every s 2 S :
(a) margS ￿i ￿ ￿
f
i (￿j￿i(s);f(s)) = ￿
s;f(s)
i and
(b) margS ￿i ￿ ￿
f
i (j￿i(s);f￿(s)) assigns probability 1 to the state s:
Proof of lemma 3: Let f 2 F: For every tuple (f;s;e s;i) s.t. e s 2 ￿i(s) \ S(f(s))
de￿ne a function (f;s;e s) as follows:
(f;s;e s)(s) =
￿
f(s) s = e s
f￿(s) s 6= e s
De￿ne Fi(f;s) = f(f;s;e s)je s 2 S(f(s)) \ ￿i(s)g
It is easy to see that since f￿(s) 6= f￿(s0) for s 6= s0 and since for every s;s0 2 S
f(s) 6= f￿(s0) the argument that was presented in the proof of lemma 1 implies that
there exists a probability measure ￿
f;s
i on F with a support in Fi(f;s) such that:
(a) margS ￿i ￿ ￿
f;s
i (￿j￿i(s);f(s)) = ￿
s;f(s)
i :
(b) For every s 2 S margS ￿i ￿￿
f;s
i (￿j￿i(s);f￿(s)) assigns probability 1 to the state
s:
De￿ne now,
Fi(f) = [s2SFi(f;s) and de￿ne a probability measure ￿
f










Since f(s) 6= f(s0) for s 6= s0 it is easy to see that (a) and (b) above imply that for
every s 2 S we have:
margS ￿i ￿ ￿
f
i (￿j￿i(s);f(s)) = ￿
s;f(s)
i :
margS ￿i ￿ ￿
f
i (￿j￿i(s);f￿(s)) assigns probability 1 to the state s:
Thus, the proof of lemma 3 is complete.
For every f 2 F and i 2 I we de￿ne a type t
f












i p = f(s)
ys
i p = f￿(s)











i jf 2 F
o
: We now construct the model M so that we can assign to each
type t
f





i ) denote the pro￿le of types where the type of agent i is t
f
i and the type
of every agent j 6= i is t
g
j: Since there is a continuum of agents the demand of agent i




i ) induces the price







i ))js 2 S;f 2 F;g 2 Fi(f)
o
The demand function of a type t
f














i )) = ￿i(s) ￿ ￿
f
i (g):















follows that M satis￿es common knowledge of rationality and market clearing. We now
complete the proof by showing that for every s 2 S and p 2 Ps there exist a state of the
world ! 2 ￿ in which the state of nature is s and the price is p: So let f 2 F be a price
function such that f(s) = p: De￿ne the price function g 2 F as follows:
g(s) =
￿
f(s) s = s






i )) is a state of the world in ￿ and hence (p;s) is a CKRMC outcome.
The proof of theorem 2 is now complete.
6.3 Example 3
This is an example of an economy with two states in which there is no REE and yet
there is a segment of prices that are CKRMC in both states.
There are two states, S = f1;2g; and each one of them has a probability 0:5: There










: Agents in I1 know
the true state. The others don￿ t know it. The utilities of the agents are similar to those
de￿ned in the previous examples, so ui(x;m;s) is as log(x)+m if i 2 I1 it is bs log(x)+m
if i 2 I2 and it is cs log(x) + m if i 2 I3: Also, the aggregate amount of X is 1 and each
agent has enough money.
We assume:
(6.2) a1 > a2; b1 < b2; c1 > c2:
(6.3) b p ￿ a1 ￿ ￿ + (b1 + c1) ￿
(1￿￿)
2 = a2 ￿ ￿ + (b2 + c2) ￿
(1￿￿)
2
The equality in (6.3) implies non-existence of a REE: The argument is familiar:
Full revelation would imply that the price which clears the market is b p in both states.
However, if that is the case then b p does not reveal the true state. On the other hand
there cannot be a non-revealing REE f;f(1) = f(2) because the demands of agents in
I1 for X in states 1and 2 are di⁄erent so the same price cannot clear the market in both
states.
We now compute the set of prices that are Ex-Post Rationalizable w.r.t S and then use
theorem 2 to conclude that this is also the set of prices that are CKRMC in both states.
The computation is similar to the one in example 1 in the main text. Let Ps;s = 1;2;
be the set of prices that clear the market in state s when agents in I2 [I3 may have any
28pro￿le of probabilities b ￿ = fb ￿igi2I2[I3 on S (agents in I1 assign , of course, probability 1
to the true state.) We claim that :
P1 =
h
a1 ￿ ￿ + (b1 + c2) ￿
(1￿￿)






a2 ￿ ￿ + (b1 + c2) ￿
(1￿￿)




To see this we note that the extreme points in each set are clearly the lowest and
highest prices in the respective states ( for example, the demand of agents in I2 [ I3
is minimal when agents in I2 assign probability 1 to the state 1and agents in I3 assign
probability 1to the state 2: When these are the beliefs the clearing prices in states 1 and
2 are the respective minimal points in P1 and P2: ) Any price p between these points
can be obtained as a clearing price by having a fraction ￿ = ￿(p) of the agents in I2
and I3 assign probability 1 to the states 1 and 2 respectively and a fraction 1 ￿ ￿(p)
assign probability 1 to the states 2 and 1 respectively. The set of prices that are Ex-Post
Rationalizable w.r.t S is:
P ￿ P1 \ P2 =
h
a1 ￿ ￿ + (b1 + c2) ￿
(1￿￿)




It follows from (6.2) and (6.3) that this is a non-empty segment. Theorem 2 implies
that P is also the set of prices that are CKRMC in both states:
6.4 Proof of proposition 1
The proof of proposition 1 relies on lemma 4 below. To state the lemma we need the
following notation. Let ￿ be a number 0￿ ￿ ￿ 1: Denote by ￿(￿); ￿(￿) = f￿(￿)igi2I ; the
pro￿le of probabilities where ￿(￿)i assigns probabilities ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿ respectively to the
maximal and minimal states in the set ￿i(b s) \ b S:
Lemma 4:
(a) For every 0￿ ￿ ￿ 1 there exists a single equilibrium price w.r.t ￿(￿): Denote this
price by p(￿):
(b) p(￿) is continuous in ￿:
(c) Let ￿ = (￿i)i2I; ￿i 2 4(￿i(b s) \ b S); be a pro￿le of probabilities such that there
exists a price p which is an equilibrium price w.r.t ￿ then p(b s; b S) ￿ p ￿ p(b s; b S):
Proof of lemma 4
Let i 2 Il for some l 2 f1;::Lg; ￿ 2 4(S); and p 2 R+: We let xl(￿;p) denote the
demand of i for X at the price p when the probability distribution of player i on S is ￿:
(We note that for a given ￿ and p all the agents in Il have the same demand hence the
notation xl(￿;p):) Our assumptions on the utility function ul imply that xl(￿;p) is an
internal solution and therefore satis￿es the ￿rst order condition i.e.,
(6.4)
P
s2S ￿(s) ￿ u0
l(xl(￿;p);s) = p
29Let 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1: Recall that ￿(￿) is a pro￿le of probabilities ￿(￿) = f￿i(￿)gi2I where
for i 2 Il ￿i(￿) is the probability distribution that assigns probabilities ￿ and 1-￿; re-
spectively, to the maximal and minimal states in ￿l(b s) \ b S: Thus, in the pro￿le ￿(￿) all
the agents of the same type have the same probability distribution on S. Therefore, for
every price p there exists an aggregate demand x(￿(￿);p); which equals:
(6.5) x(￿(￿);p) =
PL
l=1 ￿l ￿ xl(￿l(￿);p)
where xl(￿l(￿);p) is the demand of an agent in Il: The FOC (6.4) plus the assumption
that u0
l has a negative derivative imply that for every agent i 2 Il and every probability
￿ 2 4(￿l(b s) \ b S) the demand of i for X; xl(￿;p);is: 1. Continuous in p: 2. Strictly
decreasing in p: 3. limp!1xl(￿;p) = 0 and limp!0xl(￿;p) = 1: It follows that for every
￿ the aggregate demand x(￿(￿);p) has properties 1., 2. and 3. as well. These properties
imply that for every ￿ there exits a unique price p;p = p(￿); such that x(￿(￿);p) = p:
Thus, part (a) of the lemma is established.
Consider now part (b). We will show that p(￿) is di⁄erentiable. It follows from (6.5)
and part (a) that for every 0￿ ￿ ￿ 1 we can write:
(6.6)
PL
l=1 ￿l ￿ xl(￿l(￿);p(￿)) ￿ x = 0
where x is the aggregate amount of X in the economy. If each function xl has




@p 6= 0 then we can apply














@￿ indeed exist, are continuous, and
@xl
@p <0:
Equation (6.7) below is the FOC (4.1) of the optimization problem of an agent in Il
w.r.t the probability distribution ￿l(￿) and the price p;
(6.7) ￿ ￿ u0
l(xl(￿l(￿);p);sl) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ u0
l(xl(￿l(￿);p);sl) ￿ p = 0
where sl and sl are the maximal and minimal states in the set ￿l(b s)\ b S, respectively.
Since u0
l has a continuous derivative and since u
00
l <0 we can apply the implicit function














@￿ exists and since u0
l and u
00
l are continuous it is continuous as well.
Using again the equation (6.7) and applying the implicit function theorem, this time,











@p exists, it is continuous, and since u
00
l <0 it is di⁄erent from zero.
This completes the proof that p(￿) is di⁄erentiable.
We turn now to part (c). Since u0
l(x;s) is increasing in s and decreasing in x it is easy
to see that (6.4) implies that xl(￿l(1);p) > xl(￿;p) for any ￿ 2 4(￿l(b s) \ b S);￿ 6= ￿l(1)
and any p: It follows that for any pro￿le of probabilities ￿ = f￿igi2I ; ￿i 2 4(￿i(b s) \ b S);
and any price p; if the aggregate demand x(￿;p) exists it is smaller or equal to x(￿(1);p):
Since for every agent i 2 Il the demand xl(￿;p) is strictly decreasing in p an equilibrium
30price w.r.t the pro￿le ￿;p(￿); cannot be higher than p(1): A similar argument establishes
that p(￿) cannot be smaller than p(0): Thus, the proof of part (c) is complete.
The proof of proposition 1 from lemma 4 is simple. We have p(1) = p(b s; b S) and p(0) =
p(b s; b S): The continuity of p(￿) implies that for every p; p(0) ￿ p ￿ p(1); there exists a ￿
such that p = p(￿): Therefore, P(b s; b S) ￿
h
p(b s; b S);p(b s; b S)
i
: On the other hand part (c)
of lemma 4 implies that P(b s; b S) ￿
h
p(b s; b S);p(b s; b S)
i
:
6.5 Proof of proposition 2
(a) By de￿nition P([s;s]) = \s2[s;s]P(s;[s;s]): Therefore, p 2 P([s;s]) ) p 2 P(s;[s;s])
for every s 2 [s;s]: Since by lemma 4 p(s;[s;s]) is the minimal element in P(s;[s;s]) we





: For the other direction we observe that since the
information sets of each agent are segments (assumption 3) then for every s 2 [s;s] and
i 2 I the maximal state in the set ￿i(s)\ [s;s] is greater or equal to the maximal state
in the set ￿i(s)\ [s;s]: It follows that for every s 2 S p(s;[s;s]) ￿ p(s;[s;s]): Similarly,





and therefore the result follows.
(b) By de￿nition Ps ￿ [s2b SP(b S): Clearly, [s2[s;s]P([s;s]) ￿ [s2b SP(b S) because the
union in the RHS is taken over a larger set of sets. We will establish the claim by showing
that for every set b S P(b S) ￿ P([s;s]) where s and s are the minimal and maximal states
respectively in b S: To see this recall that P(b S) ￿ \s2b SP(s; b S) and therefore, in particular,
P(b S) ￿ P(s; b S) and P(b S) ￿ P(s; b S): It follows that P(b S) ￿
h
p(s; b S);p(s; b S)
i
: Now since
b S ￿ [s;s] we have p(s; b S) ￿ p(s;[s;s]) and p(s; b S) ￿ p(s;[s;s]): It follows that P(b S) ￿ ￿
p(s;[s;s]);p(s;[s;s])
￿
= P([s;s]) where the last equality is established by part (a) of the
proposition.
6.6 Proof of proposition 3
Since Ps strictly contains P(fsg) then either there exists p<P(fsg) such that p 2 Ps
or there exists p > P(fsg) such that p 2 Ps: Assume w.l.o.g the former case. Let p be
the minimal element in Ps: Assume, ￿rst, that there is a single set [s;s];s 2 [s;s]; such
that p 2 P([s;s]): Since p is the minimal element in P([s;s]); it follows from part (a)
of proposition 2 that p = p(s;[s;s]): Consider the state s: Clearly, there exists a set of
agents Il; l 2 f1;::;Lg; such that ￿l(s)\ [s;s] strictly contains s; because if that were
31not the case then p(s; [s;s]) > p(s; [s;s]) implying that P([s;s]) = ; in contradiction
to the assumption that p 2 P([s;s]): Let I0 be a set of agents of a positive measure
in Il (the measure of I0 can be as small as we wish:) Since the minimal state in the
set ￿l(s)\ [s;s];e s; is strictly smaller than s the demand of agents in I0 at e s is smaller
than their demand at the state s: Since the set I0 has a positive measure it follows that
p(s;[s;s]) is strictly smaller than pI0(s;[s;s]): (Recall that the superscript I0 refers to
the economy EI0that is obtained form the original economy E by re￿ning the knowledge
of agents in I0:) So the point is that p(s;[s;s]) is an equilibrium price for a pro￿le of
probabilities e ￿ in which agents in I0 assign probability 1 to the state e s while pI0(s;[s;s] is
an equilibrium price for a pro￿le of probabilities ￿ where agents in I0 assign probability
1to s: (Agents that do not belong to I0 have the same beliefs in ￿ and e ￿:) In particular,
p = p(s;[s;s]) = 2 P I0([s;s]): Since by assumption there was no segment of states [s￿;s￿];
s 2 [s￿;s￿];[s￿;s￿] 6= [s;s]; such that p 2 P( [s￿;s￿]) and since for any set [s￿;s￿]; P I0(
[s￿;s￿]) ￿ P([s￿;s￿])23; it follows that p = 2 P I0
s and therefore P I0
s is strictly contained in
Ps: We have thus proved the proposition for the case where p belongs to a single set
P [s;s]: It is easy to see that if p belongs to a collection of sets we can ￿nd for each
such set, P( [s￿;s￿]);a set of agents I0, I0 = I0( [s￿;s￿]); such that p = 2 P I0([s￿;s￿]): In
the economy which is obtained by all these re￿nements p is not a price that is Ex-Post
Rationalizable w.r.t s:
6.7 Robustness of economies in which there is a segment of
prices that are Ex-Post Rationalizable in every state
We start with a de￿nition of a metric on the space of economies.
Let E(n;L;￿) denote the set of economies where S = f1;::;ng is the set of states,
L = fI1;::;ILg is the set of types of agents, and ￿ = (￿1;::;￿L) is the pro￿le of information
partitions of the di⁄erent types. An economy E in E(n;L;￿) is characterized by a
vector (￿l;ml;xl;ul)l2L: The distance between two vectors E and E0 is de￿ned as the
maximal distance among the coordinates of the two vectors where the distance between
the di⁄erent coordinates is de￿ned as follows: The distance between two numbers is the
absolute value of their di⁄erence. Since the demand function of an agent depends on
the derivative of his utility we de￿ne the distance between utility functions u and v as
follows:
d(u;v) ￿ maxfku ￿ vk;ku0 ￿ v0k;ku00 ￿ v00kg
where k￿k is the supremum norm, i.e.,
kuk ￿ sup
￿




23Any refeinment of the knowledge of any set of agents can only shrink the set of prices that are
Ex-Post Rationalizable w.r.t a given set of states b S: Therefore, PI
0
( [s￿;s￿]) which is the set of prices
that are Ex-Post Rationalizable w.r.t [s￿;s￿] in the economy EI
0
is contained, in the weak sense, in P(
[s￿;s￿]:
32We now show that the set of economies in which there is a segment of prices that
are Ex-Post Rationalizable in every state is open. Let E be an economy such that
p(n;[1;n]) < p(1;[1;n]): To economize in notation we let p and p denote the prices





is Ex-Post Rationalizable in every state. We will show that a ￿ small￿
change in the utilities of the agents induces a ￿ small￿change in the prices p and p; so
that if the change in the utilities is su¢ ciently small the inequality p < p is maintained.
It will then be easy to see that a small change in the other parameters of the economy
(f￿l;ml;xl;gl2L) also leads to a small change in p and p: This will establish the existence
of a neighborhood of E, N(E); such that for every E0 2 N(E) there exists a segment of
prices that are Ex-Post Rationalizable in every state.
Consider the price p (the argument for the price p is similar.) The price p is generated
by a pro￿le of beliefs ￿ ￿ f￿igi2I where all players of the same type assign probability 1
to the same state. We ￿x the pro￿le ￿ and examine the change in the clearing price when
there is a small change in the utilities of the agents. Let ul; l 2 L; denote the utility of
an agent of type l in E: First, we note that for every l 2 L and closed positive segment in




￿ ￿ is bounded from above and below by positive
numbers Ml and ml;respectively. Let v =(v1;:::;vL) be a vector of utilities such that
d(ul;vl) < ￿ for every l 2 L: We have ml￿￿ ￿ jv00
l j ￿ Ml+￿: De￿ne C ￿ maxl2L
Ml
ml￿"and
let pv denote the clearing price for the utilities v at the beliefs ￿:
Claim: jpv ￿ pj ￿ 2C":
Proof: Let u be a utility, l a type, and p a price. We let xl(p;u) denote the demand
of an agent who has the belief ￿l;￿l ￿ ￿i for i 2 l; and the utility u at the price p: We
have
(6.10) jxl(p;ul) ￿ xl(pv;vl)j ￿ jxl(pv;ul) ￿ xl(p;ul)j ￿ jxl(pv;ul) ￿ xl(pv;vl)j:
(6.11) jxl(pv;ul) ￿ xl(p;ul)j ￿
jp￿pvj
Ml :
(6.12) jxl(pv;ul) ￿ xl(pv;vl)j ￿ "
ml￿￿:
The inequality (6.10) is the triangle inequality. Let sl denote the state to which the
belief ￿l assigns probability 1. To see (6.11) we note that the ￿rst-order condition implies
that ju0
l(xl(pv;ul);sl) ￿ u0




￿ ￿ ￿ Ml (6.11) follows.
The inequality (6.12) is established in a similar way; the ￿rst-order condition implies
that u0
l(xl(pv;ul);sl) = v0
l(xl(pv;v);sl) = p￿: Since v00
l is bounded from below by ml ￿ ￿
the fact that ku0
l ￿ v0
lk ￿ " as well implies (6.12). The inequalities (6.10)-(6.12) imply
that if pv ￿ p > 2C" then xl(p;ul) > xl(pv;vl) for every l 2 L which means that when
the vector of utilities is v there is excess supply of X at the price pv and hence it cannot
be a clearing price : Similarly, pv cannot be a clearing price if p ￿ pv > 2C": The claim
follows.
We have, thus, shown that a small change in the utilities of the agents induces a small
change in the prices p and p: The argument that a small change in the other parameters
of the economy also induces a small change in p and p is simpler. We omit the details.
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